This paper investigates whether the socioeconomic status of the head of government helps explain fiscal performance. Applying sociological research that attributes differences in people's ways of thinking and acting to their relative standing within society, we test whether the social status of German prime ministers can help explain differences in fiscal performance among the German Laender. Our empirical findings show that the tenures of prime ministers from a poorer socioeconomic background are associated with higher levels of public spending and debt financing. Social mobility has an asymmetric influence: social climbers adapt to their new class, whereas downwardly mobile prime ministers remain primarily influenced by their parents' upper-class status.
Introduction
Explaining variations in government size and public debt accumulation is an important issue for political economists, and one for which the motives of relevant political actors are thought to play a decisive role. The literature typically assumes that political decision-making is driven by one of three motivations. First, politicians behave in a purely opportunistic manner.
For instance, political budget cycle (PBC) theorists argue that public spending and debt financing are connected to the legislation cycle (e.g., Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Alesina et al., 1992 ): 1 to enhance their re-election prospects, politicians are expected to raise the level of public expenditure and debt financing in election years, while fiscal consolidation is expected to occur in the aftermath of an election.
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A second branch of the literature views politicians as purely benevolent. Political actors design fiscal policy to optimise some sort of social welfare function. A well-known example is Barro's (1979) tax-smoothing hypothesis, in which it is assumed that governments choose tax rates with the aim of minimising the excess burden of taxation. As a consequence, the accumulation of public debt is expected to be linked to the business cycle, since governments are assumed to incur deficits during recessions and surpluses during booms (Alesina and Perotti, 1994) .
Finally, there are political economists who link political performance to partisan ideology (see, e.g., Hibbs, 1977; Buchanan and Wagner, 1977) . A common assumption in this body of literature is that the tenures of left-wing governments are associated with higher levels of public spending and debt financing than are the tenures of right-wing governments (e.g., Blais et al., 1993; Cusack, 1997) .
However, empirical analyses cast serious doubt on all three theoretical approaches, since findings from different studies are often contradictory and the employed covariates have low explanatory power. In the case of PBC theory, for example, Shi and Svensson (2006) find robust evidence for PBCs in fiscal deficits for developing countries, but not for developed countries. Brender and Drazen (2005) provide similar results based on a differentiation between new and established democracies: PBCs are found in the former only.
Results from the two other strands are, at best, mixed, too. With respect to the partisan hypothesis, there is some evidence from OECD countries that tenures of left-wing 1 Originally, the theory of political business cycles was formulated in a Phillips curve context. See Nordhaus (1975) and MacRae (1977) . 2 These implications depend on the assumption that voters are either myopic, i.e. they overestimate the benefit of current public spending and underestimate the costs of future taxes (Alesina and Perotti, 1994) , or have imperfect information regarding the competence of the incumbent government and the costs of publicly provided goods (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Rogoff, 1990) . See Alesina and Perotti (1994) and Eslava (2006) for a summary.
governments are indeed associated with an increase in public expenditure (e.g., de Sturm, 1994, 1997; Cusack, 1997) , but the conclusion that leftist incumbents accumulate higher public debt becomes less compelling in light of the experience of many Western European countries between 1960-1990. Finally, the tax-smoothing approach is not in line with public budgets in many OECD countries during the 1970s and 1980s (Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Alesina and Perotti, 1994) .
In particular, the absence of fiscal adjustments in some OECD countries after the recession of [1973] [1974] and differences in the accumulation of public debt in the following decades cannot be convincingly explained by a tax-smoothing motive.
So, what is driving the fiscal decisions of political actors? In this paper, we argue that a broader social science perspective may provide some important insights. Sociologists emphasise the strong connection between an individual's socioeconomic backgroundespecially factors that determine an individual's relative position within society, called status-and preferences, attitudes, and habits. There is a considerable amount of political economics literature suggesting that factors related to individuals' status-such as occupation, income, and education-help explain differences in policy preferences and decision behaviour, but typically these variables are employed in a more or less ad hoc fashion. To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical work that links theoretical research on status to the fiscal behaviour of leaders. We fill this gap by investigating the impact that a political actor's family status has on his or her fiscal preferences. To this end, we utilise observations on the prime ministers (Ministerpräsidenten), of the fiscally partially autonomous states making up the Federal Republic of Germany, the Laender (Bundesländer). We concentrate on the social status of the German Laenders' prime ministers and study its influence on the level of public expenditure as well as on debt financing. Based on biographical histories, we compile a unique dataset containing information about German prime ministers' parental and personal status, along with several additional sociodemographic variables. We cover the We are not the first to analyse the relationship between political leaders' identities and characteristics and political and economic outcomes. In recent years, a considerable body of empirical literature has emerged which investigates whether politicians affect (i) economic growth (Jones and Olken, 2005; Besley et al., 2011) , (ii) constitutional and institutional frameworks (Dreher et al., 2009; Hayo and Voigt, 2013) , and (iii) fiscal policies (Mikosch, 2009; Jochimsen and Thomasius, 2012; Moessinger, 2012) . Previous research commonly focuses on politicians' educational and professional experiences. Most closely related to our analysis are the studies by Dreher et al. (2009), Jochimsen and Thomasius (2012) , and Mikosch (2009) , who investigate whether leaders with an economics background tend to liberalise the economy and run up lower public deficits, respectively. Conceptually, our study differs from the aforementioned approaches by building on a long tradition of theoretical and empirical social science research. Thus, in interpreting our results, we rely on a well-defined theoretical framework as well as extensively tested behavioural assumptions. This framework allows us to derive clearly defined hypothesis for our empirical investigation. This approach makes our analysis a rather novel contribution to interdisciplinary research in political economics, where few insights from sociology have been utilised so far. Instead of focussing on the effect of intentionally acquired professional expertise, we stress the importance of status-dependent, pre-reflexive dispositions for the decisions of political leaders.
Also in the context of the German Laender, but over a much shorter sample period, Hayo and Neumeier (2012) study whether a leader's status exerts an influence on the composition of public expenditure, i.e., the shares of public spending devoted to certain budget items in relation to total public spending. Within the context of stratification theory, a theoretical framework is developed for why relative shares of budget components should be affected by the responsible political leader's social status. Empirically, it is found that governments led by prime ministers from a poor socioeconomic background spend significantly more on social security, education, health, infrastructure, and public safety.
In our empirical analysis, we study two important fiscal variables: the size of the public sector, i.e., the total amount of public spending, and the deficit of the state government, i.e., its ability to balance revenues and expenditures. As to the first, our study is a novel contribution to a long history of empirical economic research on the determinants of government size, the results of which are inconclusive and certainly non-robust empirically.
As to the second variable, we contribute to an understanding of the causes of excessive public borrowing, the importance of which has been emphasised by the ongoing debt crisis in Europe.
We find strong and theory-consistent evidence that a prime minister's socioeconomic background matters in terms of the incumbent government's fiscal performance: the higher a prime minister's status, the lower the public expenditures and debt financing. We also find an asymmetric effect of social mobility: whereas there is no statistical difference between upwardly mobile prime-ministers-i.e., prime ministers with low parental status, but high personal status-and upper-class prime ministers-i.e., prime ministers with high parental status and high personal status-with respect to the levels of public spending and deficit financing, downwardly mobile prime ministers appear to spend significantly less and incur fewer debts than their upper-class counterparts.
Methodologically, our empirical approach is based on the application of a consistent generalto-specific modelling strategy, which has several advantages compared to the commonly employed specific-to-general modelling approach (see Hendry, 2000) . In addition, several robustness checks reveal that the impact of leaders' socioeconomic background on the Laenders' fiscal performance appears to be much more important than that of political factors proposed by 'traditional' political economic approaches. This supports our belief that economics may benefit substantially from integrating social science research.
Choosing the German Laender as objects of analysis has three advantages. First, they are highly homogeneous with regard to politics, culture, demography, and institutional as well as constitutional frameworks. Second, this homogeneity limits the number of necessary control variables. Third, the Laender are constitutionally endowed with a high degree of fiscal authority regarding budgetary matters. These advantages have made the German Laender a popular object of research into the motivations of incumbent governments. However, neither the PBC theorem (Berger and Holler, 2007; Schneider, 2010) , the tax-smoothing approach (Seitz, 2000) , nor the partisan hypothesis (Seitz, 2000; Galli and Rossi, 2002; Jochimsen and Nuscheler, 2011; Schneider, 2010) can be convincingly supported by the results of these empirical studies.
In the next section of this paper, we discuss related literature. In Section 3, we take a brief look at the German system of fiscal federalism and its political landscape. Then, in Section 4, we introduce the concept of status, provide empirical measures for it, and identify transmission channels that link a person's status to his or her preferences for public expenditure and debt financing. In Section 5, we motivate our empirical approach. Section 6 presents the results of our main analysis, in which we investigate the influence of German prime ministers' socioeconomic backgrounds on the fiscal performances of the German Laender. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
By focussing on how the head of government influences economic outcomes, this paper contributes to an expanding branch of the literature. Starting with the work of Jones and Olken (2005) , researchers have become increasingly concerned with the question of whether politicians exert an impact on economic performance. Jones and Olken (2005) provide evidence that leaders do influence the rate of economic growth in their country. They compare GDP growth rates before and after exogenous leader changes (i.e., leader transitions occurring due to the natural death of the incumbent) and find significant differences. Brender and Drazen (2013) test whether leader transitions affect the composition of government expenditures, finding significant effects in the long run. A major drawback of both studies is that they assume the relevant characteristics to be randomly distributed across political leaders and it is thus unclear in what specific characteristics leaders differ.
Other researchers attempt to overcome this shortcoming by focussing on the sociodemographics of leaders, e.g., age, tenure, education, and professional background, but with limited success. Mikosch (2009) employs the same dataset in an attempt to explain differences in public deficits. According to his results, tenures of former economists, white-collar workers, and blue-collar workers are associated with significantly higher deficits than tenures of leaders 3 Leader characteristics are also found to be connected to changes in the form of government. For instance, employing a large sample of countries, Hayo and Voigt (2013) study determinants of constitutional change, particularly movements from the status quo toward more parliamentarism or presidentialism. They find that these changes are influenced by specific characteristics of political leaders. Individual characteristics are also used as explanatory variables for committee decisions. For instance, focussing on members of monetary policy committees rather than heads of government, Göhlmann and Vaubel (2007) investigate the impact of education and occupation histories of 391 central bankers from 10 European countries on inflation outcomes. who have been politicians most of their working life. However, this finding is counterintuitive and actually contradicts the author's hypothesis that economists should reduce public debt.
Yet other studies analyse the association between sociodemographic characteristics of finance ministers and economic performance. Based on data from 15 European countries, Moessinger (2012) detects a negative relationship between finance ministers' tenure and political experience on the one hand, and debt-to-GDP growth rates on the other. In contrast, the educational background of finance ministers has no significant impact.
Finally, Jochimsen and Thomasius (2012) investigate the influence of several characteristics of finance ministers-including age, years in office, and educational and professional experience-on public deficits using panel data from the West German Laender. Their findings suggest that the tenures of finance ministers who either gained financial expertise prior to pursuing a political career or formerly were members of parliament are associated with significantly lower fiscal deficits, whereas educational background appears to be irrelevant. 4 Moreover, experience is found to matter: the longer the finance minister stays in office, the lower the deficit.
A problem with studies focussing on politicians' educational and professional experience is that the theoretical link between, say, certain educational and occupational backgrounds and economic performance remains vague. The authors typically refer to some sort of socialisation or, rather, 'professional indoctrination', which economists and business experts in particular are presumed to experience. However, experimental studies show that the differences between economists and other people with respect to ways of thinking and acting can at least partially be ascribed to a selection effect (for a summary on experimental findings, see Goossens and Méon, 2010) . Moreover, sociological research reveals that educational and occupational choices themselves depend on social environment, in particular family status (e.g., Bourdieu, 1984) . Hence, the professional experience of politicians before taking a high political office must be considered as endogenous. Consequently, instead of focussing on specific fields of education and work, we look at leaders' family status, i.e., parental status and the status of positions held by prime ministers before taking office. Our novel approach to the analysis of leaders' influence is motivated by manifold empirical findings linking individual status to motives and patterns of behaviour. The status-dependent conditions of people throughout the life course are believed to constitute a set of pre-reflexive dispositions which-unlike intentionally acquired professional skills or expertise-have a subconscious influence on the way people think and act, which makes them particularly effective (Bourdieu, 1977 (Bourdieu, , 1984 Pickel, 2005) . These dispositions become manifest in everyday life: a person's status is reflected in her views, attitudes, and preferences, her way of speaking and dressing, and so on.
Fiscal Federalism and Political Landscape in Germany
The German federal system consists of three parliamentary governmental levels-federal, state, and local-each with its own fiscal competences and responsibilities as specified by the German Constitution (the Grundgesetz). Governments at the state level are led by either CDU/CSU or SPD. During the period we study, some of the states in our sample have a one-party government, others are governed by some form of coalition government (mainly made up of two parties), a majority government, or a minority government.
Since the political system of the German Laender is parliamentary, it is reasonable to ask whether it is even possible for German prime ministers to influence fiscal policy. De jure they can, for at least two reasons. First, the prime minister appoints the cabinet ministers and therefore can to some extent ensure that the members of government back his or her preferred policy. Second, the prime minister has guideline competences (Richtlinienkompetenz), meaning that he or she has the authority to issue directives to the ministers. Some hints of a de facto association between fiscal performance and prime minister transitions can be found in Figures A1 and A2 of the Appendix, which present movements in public spending and net public borrowing, respectively, within the West German non-city states between 1974-2009. To filter out symmetric business cycle effects, we calculated deviations from the contemporary means across the Laender. The marks along the single series indicate changes of prime minister. We observe a remarkable extent of cross-Laender variation with respect to fiscal performance. Moreover, leader transitions tend to be followed by changes in the (relative) level of public expenditure and debt financing. It is noteworthy that leader transitions do not necessarily coincide with changes in the governing party. In fact, only in 19 out of 54 cases did the incumbent prime minister have to leave office because he or she had not been re-elected. Hence, we need to distinguish carefully between leader and party effects.
The Status Concept, its Measurement, and Implications for Individual Behaviour
In this section, we clarify the concept of status, discuss its implications for motives and patterns of behaviour, and show how it can be measured. First, we provide a definition of status and discuss quantitative status indicators widely used in many areas of sociology.
Second, we briefly describe how status influences individual modes of thinking and acting and present some empirical evidence linking attributes of status with economic behaviour and fiscal preferences.
Defining and Measuring Status
Sociologists emphasise that social stratification is a central feature of modern societies, implying that societies must be viewed as hierarchical formations within which individuals and groups can be ranked according to certain principles. The term status refers to a person's rank within this hierarchy. People of equal rank constitute a social class. Ranking of people provides individuals with an incentive to meet the requirements of a specific social position.
As a functioning mechanism a society must somehow distribute its members in social positions and induce them to perform the duties of these positions. It must thus concern itself with motivation at two different levels: to instill in the proper individuals the desire to fill certain positions, and, once in these positions, the desire to perform the duties attached to them. (Davis and Moore, 1945: 242) Accordingly, an individual's status depends on the functional importance of the social position occupied. In modern societies, the position regarded as most relevant for an individual's status is occupation. Hence, in the following we concentrate our discussion on occupational status. Factors indicating the functional importance of a specific occupationand thus reflecting its status-are its endowment with certain resources and its association with valuable attributes (Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Ganzeboom et al., 1992 ).
Status as a theoretical concept is operationalised by two types of indicators: subjective and objective. Based on survey data, indicators relying on subjective measures usually evaluate the prestige connected with different occupations. A widely used index is the Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale (SIOPS) by Treiman (1977) . Objective indicators focus on the level of income and education associated with a certain occupation. A frequently applied objective index is the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) introduced by Ganzeboom et al. (1992) . This index is constructed by combining information on the average level of education and average income in different occupations.
Despite their differences, both indices provide a continuous measure of occupational status ranging from 0 to 100. However, in the subsequent analysis, we divide each index score by 100 to facilitate interpretation by avoiding very small coefficients. Both ISEI and SIOPS are based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-68) of the International Labour Organization (ILO, 1969) , which makes them directly comparable.
Although these indices are constructed based on international data, they are included in prominent nationwide surveys, such as the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) or the German General Social Survey (GGSS/ALLBUS), and appear to perform well in empirical applications to Germany (Büchner and Gerlitz, 2005) . Table 1 illustrates ISEI and SIOPS scores for selected occupations.
Demonstrating the reliability of both indices in the case of the GGSS, Wolf (1995) reports a Pearson's correlation coefficient of 0.88. In the main part of our analysis, we rely on the ISEI, since its construction is more transparent than that of a subjective indicator, but we also employ the SIOPS in robustness tests. Note: Original ISEI and SIOPS scores are divided by 100.
About Status, Habitus, and Individual Behaviour
There is a close connection between a society's social structure and individual behaviour, as personal status, i.e., membership in a certain social class, translates into specific dispositions, called habitus, which become manifest in particular patterns of appraisal and practice (e.g., Giddens, 1984; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) . These dispositions are believed to be a reflection of the socioeconomic conditions and the manifold forms of either social deprivation or privilege people of a certain class typically face (Bourdieu, 1977) . Any status-conscious society endows those striving for or holding social positions associated with a higher status with resources and attributes regarded as valuable by society-such as income, education, and prestige-and provides them with designated careers or trajectories, along which they gather similar experiences. It is this common set of endowments and experiences held by members of the same social rank that contributes to the formation of a class habitus, i.e., a homogenous set of cognitive and action schemes shared by people of similar standing.
8 Two phases in a person's life are considered particularly important for the inclination toward a certain class habitus (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) . During childhood, i.e., the phase of primary socialisation, adolescents are believed to internalise the dispositions characterising so-called significant others, such as parents or peers, who serve as role-models and affect the development of specific patterns of appraisal and practice (Mead, 1967) . At this stage of life, parental status is decisive for affiliation with a certain social class and the inclination of individuals to adopt a certain class habitus. After reaching adulthood, first experiences and personal circumstances make up the phase called secondary socialisation, which provides additional influence on a person's modes of thinking and acting. Personal status is of utmost importance during this period of life. Primary socialisation is regarded as 'the most important one for an individual', whereas 'the basic structure of all secondary socialization has to resemble that of primary socialization' (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 131) . This suggests that parental status has an important influence throughout an individual's life.
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Our theoretical approach suggests that politicians' decisions will reflect, among other things, the status-specific habitus of the social environment in which they were socialised. Thus, in order to infer the fiscal stance of a prime minister from his or her status, we need to uncover how fiscal policies are evaluated by the social class in which he or she grew up. According to the literature, there should be status-related differences regarding (i) attitudes toward government size and the welfare state as well as (ii) time preferences.
i. Differing attitudes toward the welfare state: Survey data indicate that individual support for a large government sector and a high degree of redistribution is negatively correlated not only with personal income and education (Corneo and Grüner, 2002; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005) , but also with family income during childhood and father's education (Alesina and Giuliano, 2009 ), supporting our conjecture as to the importance of parental background. One interpretation of this finding is that the perceived value of publicly provided services depends on status: since persons with low status are more vulnerable to undesirable life events, such as unemployment and financial distress (McLeod and Kessler, 1990) , they experience the benefits of public services more intensely and are 8 Sociological research describes numerous examples of status-related behavioural patterns: the way people speak and dress, lifestyles, taste, consumption choices, leisure activities, political attitudes, and so on (see Bourdieu, 1984; Elias, 1994) . 9 This point of view is quite different from the one employed by the few economic applications of the status concept. In those, only an individual's contemporary or future personal status is expected to influence decisionmaking. Status is seen as steering individual behaviour because it is viewed as a substitute for pecuniary incentives, i.e., status concerns are represented directly in an individual's utility function. See Fershtman et al. (1996) for a summary.
more likely to be benefitted by them. In contrast, people of higher social status rarely need to rely on the social safety net. This conclusion is supported by Breen (1997) , who argues that the modern welfare state is one of the most important institutions in reducing the high degree of uncertainty faced particularly by persons of low status.
ii. Differing time preferences: Increasing government expenditure must be financed. In
Germany, there are only two ways of accomplishing this: the government can either generate additional revenue or accumulate public debt. The choice between the two alternatives is likely affected by the time preferences of political decision makers. Huber and Runkel (2008) show that the more present-oriented or impatient a government, the more public debts it accumulates. Degree of impatience is captured by means of a hyperbolic discount function, which assumes that people are excessively concerned about their present needs (e.g., Laibson, 1997; Angeletos et al., 2001 ). There is evidence that the disposition to presence-orientation is affected by social class: Empirical studies conducted at the household level show that lower levels of education and income are associated with a higher propensity to consume (e.g., Carroll and Kimball, 1996; Börsch-Supan and Essig, 2005) and lower debt aversion (Livingstone and Lunt, 1992; Lea et al., 1993 Lea et al., , 1995 , indicating a greater than usual prevalence of myopic decision-making among individuals of low status.
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Becker and Mulligan (1997) provide an explanation for this relationship by modelling the determination of individuals' time preferences as endogenous. They show that higher levels of both education and income increase consumption patience by shifting people's attention away from their present situation to their future needs.
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Applying these arguments to the German Laender's prime ministers suggests that those with relatively lower status will be characterised by a greater emphasis on the uncertainty-reducing aspects of government activity and the welfare state as well as have less consumption patience. Based on this theoretical framework, we derive a testable hypothesis: prime 10 Further support for this conjecture is found in psychological and health studies showing that obesity, the use of tobacco and alcohol, drug addiction, etc.-which are commonly regarded as perfect examples of myopic decision-making-are much more prevalent among members of lower social classes. See Bradley and Corwyn (2002) for a review. 11 In the case of education, the authors claim that 'schooling focuses students' attention on the future. Schooling can communicate images of the situations and difficulties of adult life, which are the future of childhood and adolescence. In addition, through repeated practice at problem solving, schooling helps children learn the art of scenario simulation. Thus educated people should be more productive at reducing the remoteness of future pleasures' (Becker and Mulligan, 1997: 735-736) . With respect to income, they state that financial distress increases the desire for current income and, citing Irving Fisher, 'blinds a person to the needs of the future' (Becker and Mulligan, 1997: 732) . Our argument suggests that the magnitude of the discount parameter, which is commonly employed as an indicator of the degree of impatience (e.g., Laibson, 1997) , is positively related to status.
ministers characterised by high status engage in lower public expenditure and rely less on debt financing.
Data and Empirical Approach
We employ unbalanced panel data from 1974−2009 for the West German Laender, including both city and non-city states, and from 1992-2009 for the East German Laender (descriptive statistics and data sources are presented in the Appendix, Table A3 ) and estimate the following model:
We use two dependent variables to measure the fiscal policy stance of a prime minister: (i) public expenditure and (ii) net public borrowing, both in per cent of GDP.
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The leader variables contain characteristics describing the prime minister of state i at time t. α i is a statespecific intercept that is assumed to be time invariant and μ t a parameter that varies across time but not across states. We include the first lag of the dependent variable in our model to account for persistency and gradual budget adjustments. ζ it is an error term.
As economic control variables, we consider the first lag of the debt-to-GDP ratio in order to capture the budgetary situation, the contemporary real GDP growth rate, and the unemployment rate as business cycle indicators, and the share of net transfers received through the German fiscal equalisation system (Länderfinanzausgleich) to GDP.
14 Our political control variables measure constraints on a prime minister's power, which could affect his or her impact on fiscal performance. We add a dummy variable indicating whether the government is led by the SPD or CDU in order to capture partisan ideology effects, dummies for coalition governments and minority governments to account for effects of political dispersion or conflicts of interest, 15 and a dummy for election years to control for political budget cycles. Further, we control for the share of votes the prime minister's party received in the last election. This variable indicates the strength of the incumbent governing 12 The time constraints are due to a lack of publicly available data on public expenditure prior to 1974 for West German Laender and prior to 1992 for East German Laender. We include Berlin only from 1992 onward due to its unique status before German Unification when it was divided into West and East Berlin. 13 Note that we consider only those public expenditures the state governments are responsible for, i.e., the budgets of local authorities are not included in our data. 14 The German fiscal equalisation system (Länderfinanzausgleich) harmonises revenues across states, i.e., revenues are transferred from financially strong to weaker states. This may affect the incentive for sound fiscal policy in states that are net recipients. See Seitz (2000) for a detailed description. 15 As Edin and Ohlsson (1991) and de Sturm (1994, 1997) state, measuring political dispersion with a single ordinal variable, as employed by Roubini and Sachs (1989) , is not recommended, since this imposes a strong restriction on its effect.
party. Finally, we include a dummy that indicates whether the minister of finance is from the same party as the prime minister, since the finance minister has significant authority in preparation of the public budget. We expect that a finance minister from the same party is more likely to back the prime minister's political course (Jochimsen and Nuscheler, 2011) .
Three variables control for the demographic situation of the German Laender, namely, population size (in logarithmic terms), the dependency ratio, and population density (measured in 1,000 inhabitants per square kilometre). Population size directly affects the size of grants German Laender receive from the federal government and is found to influence government size at the national and subnational level in many empirical analyses.
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The dependency ratio is the ratio of dependents-people younger than 25 or older than 65-to the population. It is included in our analysis because these groups typically benefit overproportionally from the provision of public goods. Population density captures the degree of urbanisation, which could affect infrastructural requirements.
Our main variables of interest among the leader characteristics are the socioeconomic status of prime ministers' parents and their personal status. Both are measured by means of the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (see Section 4.1). To examine the effect of social mobility, we interact parental and personal status and add this interaction term to our specifications.
17
Following the literature, we include the following additional characteristics:
-A prime minister's age and number of years in office, thus capturing experience.
-A dummy for prime ministers who have been members of employees' associations, since membership may serve as an indicator of an individual's habitus, i.e., indicate that he or she is prone to implementing policies benefitting a certain group in society.
-A dummy for prime ministers serving states in which they did not formerly reside. We believe this variable to be an indicator of how strongly a leader is attached to the state he or she governs.
-A dummy for years in which a new prime minister comes into power to capture transition effects.
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We estimate Equation (1) (2012), one could argue that the socioeconomic background of the finance minister may be of importance, too. Unfortunately, information on the biographical histories of finance ministers' parents is not often available. We address this issue, at least partly, by controlling for the political affiliation of the finance minister, as the personal characteristics of finance ministers should be less important if they are from the same party as the prime ministers they serve. 18 Transition years imply coding problems, since we can take into account only one prime minister each year. In these cases, we decided to include the prime minister who held the office for the larger part of the year.
time-specific effects to be correlated with the other covariates. A Hausman test reveals that the results of the fixed-effects approach differ significantly from those of a random-effects approach or a pooled model, supporting our empirical specification. Panel unit-root tests indicate that both public expenditure and net public borrowing in relation to GDP are stationary.
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The lagged dependent variable correlates with the error term, which causes the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator of the autoregressive coefficient ρ to be biased downward (Judson and Owen, 1997) , while the bias in the coefficients of the exogenous regressors tends to be positive but much smaller (in absolute terms). Moreover, the bias becomes negligible for growing T (in our case, the average time-series length is roughly 28 years). An alternative to LSDV estimation is a GMM approach, as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) . However, GMM estimators suffer from poor finite sample properties for small N and tend to underestimate the coefficients of the exogenous regressors (Kiviet, 1995) . Judson and Owen (1997) , along with Kiviet (1999) , propose a bias correction for the LSDV estimator based on a two-step procedure, where a consistent estimator is chosen in the first stage. Monte-Carlo experiments suggest that the bias-corrected LSDV estimator outperforms the LSDV and GMM approach in small-N small-T panels in terms of bias and root mean squared error.
However, the suggested bias correction is not appropriate for unbalanced panel data. This problem is solved by Bruno (2005) , who extends the bias approximations to accommodate unbalanced panel data. Taking into consideration the advantages and disadvantages of the discussed estimation techniques, we rely on the LSDV estimator in the main part of our analysis and apply the bias-corrected LSDV (LSDVc) estimator suggested by Bruno (2005) as part of our robustness tests. Please note that our results would also hold under GMM estimation (results available on request).
Results

Main Specifications
Results of the regressions explaining public spending in the German Laender are presented in Table 2 , those for net public borrowing in Table 3 . In both specifications, we start by estimating a general model containing all the theory-relevant covariates described in Section 5. Then, we eliminate insignificant regressors by applying a consistent general-to-specific approach (Hendry, 2000) so as to enhance estimation efficiency.
Regarding the economic variables, we find a significantly negative impact of the lagged debtto-GDP ratio on both the level of public spending and debt financing. Hence, Laender with a poor budgetary situation reduce their expenditures and deficits, suggesting that the political process does react to the state's debt situation, but not strongly. In the short run, a 1 percentage point (pp) increase in the previous period's debt-to-GDP ratio reduces government expenditures in relation to GDP by 0.02 pp; the current deficit is reduced by 0.05 pp. The long-run multiplier is 0.07 in the case of public spending and 0.12 in the case of net borrowing, which is still quite modest.
We observe a counter-cyclical movement of public expenditures, as they are negatively affected by real GDP growth. However, the observed effect is small: a 1 pp reduction in GDP growth triggers an adjustment of 0.14 pp in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio; the long-run effect is about 0.58. The deficit-to-GDP ratio reacts to both GDP growth and the unemployment rate. After a 1 pp increase in the unemployment rate, the deficit-to-GDP ratio increases by about 0.11 pp in the short run and by about 0.26 pp in the long run, which is quite modest. We discover a positive relationship between GDP growth and the current deficit, which is difficult to interpret; however, the size of the economic effect is negligible.
Moreover, we find a significantly negative effect of received transfers on public spending. A 1 pp increase in net transfers lowers the expenditure-to-GDP ratio by 0.2 pp and the long-run multiplier is 0.83. Thus, horizontal transfers seem to have a disciplinary effect on the recipient's budget. Notes: Results are based on a least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimation. The models include cross-section and time fixed effects. Panel-robust standard errors are reported. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Among the political covariates, only a few variables survive the model reductions. The dummy for ministers of finance who are not from the same party as the prime minister has the expected positive sign in both specifications, meaning that the greater the dispersion of power within a government, the higher the level of public spending and deficit financing. However, the effect appears to be individually insignificant both in the expenditure and the deficit regressions. The dummy for minority governments also reveals a positive impact on expenditures, but the coefficient is insignificant.
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With respect to demographic variables, we find that a larger population is associated with greater public expenditure. The effect is notable: a 1 per cent increase in population leads to an increase in public expenditure of roughly 6 pp in the short term. The long-run multiplier is about 25 pp. Arguably, this finding is due to a peculiarity of the German federal system. The
Laender receive grants from the federal government based on their population. Thus, increases in population translate into higher federal grants, which allows higher public spending while keeping the deficit constant.
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Population density reveals a negative sign in both specifications. An increase in the population of 1,000 people per square kilometre causes the expenditure quota to decrease by 2.65 pp in the short run and by 11 pp in the long run. A change of the same size lowers the deficit-to-GDP ratio by about 3.3 pp in the short run and 7.5 pp in the long run.
Regarding leader characteristics, we find that both parental status and personal status remain in the reduced models. They show the expected negative signs and are significant at the 1 per cent level in both specifications. Hence, the socioeconomic conditions prime ministers are exposed to during the two phases of socialisation help explain the German Laender's fiscal performance. However, since the interaction term between parental and personal status is of notable size and significant in both specifications, the individual effects are of limited interpretative value. The negative signs of the individual effects on the one hand and the positive sign of the interaction term on the other hand indicate that an increase in parental status dampens the impact of a change in personal status and vice versa. This suggests that social mobility plays an important role in determining German prime ministers' fiscal stance.
To gain further insight into the relationship between parental status and personal status and to facilitate interpretation of the coefficients, we consider four types of prime ministers who differ only with respect to their socioeconomic backgrounds: an upper-class prime minister, i.e., one of high parental and personal status (type high); a lower-class prime minister, i.e., one of low parental and personal status (type low); an upwardly mobile prime minister, i.e., one of low parental status, but high personal status (type up); and an downwardly mobile 20 Although both dummies are individually insignificant, we cannot exclude them without violating the testingdown restriction, indicating that the coefficient estimates suffer from collinearity. 21 Shelton (2007 offers an alternative interpretation. Based on a panel of 100 countries covering the period 1970-2000, he finds a positive relationship between population size and public spending at the regional and local government levels. He argues that larger populations exhibit greater heterogeneity in preferences, which in turn leads to fostering fiscal decentralisation.
prime minister, i.e., a one of high parental status, but low personal status (type down). Note that types high and low are socially immobile, whereas types up and down are socially mobile.
We consider a status score of 0.8 as high and a status score of 0.3 as low. These values are close to the upper and lower bounds of our sample range and roughly correspond to the average status scores for academic professions on the one hand and tradesmen on the other.
We then calculate the expected expenditure-to-GDP and deficit-to-GDP ratio, respectively, for each single prime minister type, take pairwise differences and test whether these are significantly different from zero.
Results are presented in Table 4 . In line with our conjecture, we find that tenures of lowerclass prime ministers are associated with a significantly higher expenditure-to-GDP and deficit-to-GDP ratio than the tenures of their upper-class counterparts. These differences appear to be substantial: lower-class prime ministers spend on average 0.73 pp more in the short run and 3 pp more in the long run than those with an academic background. More than half this difference in public spending appears to be deficit-financed. In the short term, net borrowings are 0.54 pp higher during the tenures of lower-class prime ministers. In the long term, this effect adds up to 1.2 pp. Thus, we find strong and theory-consistent evidence that prime ministers are prone to make fiscal decisions that are in accordance with their classspecific habitus. Results are based on the reduced models. The different types of prime ministers are defined as follows: High: prime minister has high parental and personal status (ISEI score 0.8); Low: prime minister has low parental and personal status (ISEI score 0.3); Up: prime minister has low parental status (ISEI score 0.3), but high personal status (ISEI score 0.8); Down: prime minister has high parental status (ISEI score 0.8), but low personal status (ISEI score 0.3). Figures are derived as follows: first, the expected amount of public spending/net borrowing is calculated for each prime minister type, holding other factors fixed. Second, the difference between a type i prime minister (row name) and a type j prime minister (column name) is computed. * and ** indicate that the difference is significantly different from zero at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Table 4 also shows that the direction of social mobility matters for explaining the Laender's fiscal performance. We find that upwardly mobile prime ministers spend significantly less and incur fewer debts than lower-class ones, whereas no significant difference is observed between downwardly mobile and upper-class prime ministers. This suggests that parental background only matters in the case of a social decline.
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In other words, social climbers adapt to the habitus of their new class, whereas downwardly mobile prime ministers remain primarily influenced by their parent-induced upper-class habitus.
Several other leader characteristics appear to be significant as well. Tenures of prime ministers who are members of employees' associations are associated with a lower expenditure-to-GDP ratio. The short-run effect is about -0.24 pp; the long-run effect -1 pp.
This result could be due to the fact that nowadays trade unions primarily represent socially ambitious and well-trained employees with secure jobs. Interestingly, years in which a new prime minister comes into power are characterised by an increase in public spending.
Arguably, new prime ministers make inaugural gifts to increase their popularity at the beginning of their incumbency. The expenditure-to-GDP ratio is about 0.16 pp higher in transition years, with a long-run multiplier of 0.68. Other leader characteristics have no statistically significant influence on either public spending or net public borrowing.
Checks for Robustness
To check the robustness of our results and glean further insight, we conduct several experiments. First, we test whether our results are affected by the estimation method. We reestimate Equation (1) using the bias-corrected LSDV (LSDVc) estimator proposed by Bruno (2005) to account for the fact that the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term. The bias approximation requires choosing a consistent estimator in a first-stage regression; we choose the GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) .
Moreover, Bruno (2005) recommends estimating the variance-covariance matrix based on the parametric bootstrap procedure suggested by Kiviet and Bun (2001) , since the analytically derived variance-covariance estimator performs poorly if the autoregressive coefficient is large. We use 100 repetitions to create the bootstrap sample for deriving standard errors for our estimates.
The results for public spending and debt financing are presented in the Appendix, Table A4 .
In line with findings from simulation studies, most coefficients and standard errors decrease in the LSDVc approach but, in our case, the differences are generally rather small. The influence of prime minister's socioeconomic background-parental status, personal status, and the interaction term-is basically the same across both specifications. The conclusions regarding the comparison between different types of prime ministers remain unaffected, too, as can be seen from Table A5 . 23 Second, we examine the effect of including additional control variables. Here, we are primarily concerned about the potential problem of spurious causation due to omitted variables. It could be argued that our findings regarding the impact of a prime minister's socioeconomic background are driven by the socioeconomic conditions of the electorate. We investigate this possibility by including real GDP per capita in our regressions. We also control for several other factors, i.e., population growth as well as political orientation of the federal government. However, since none of these factors changes our results, we do not report these estimates (they are available on request).
Finally, we check whether choosing a different status index affects our findings. As mentioned in Section 4, there are two ways of measuring an individual's status: by objective indicators (e.g., ISEI) or by subjective indicators (e.g., SIOPS). However, replacing the ISEI scores with the SIOPS scores and re-estimating Equation (1) leaves our core results unchanged. However, yet again the results are ambiguous and not particularly robust.
In contrast, an important strand in sociological research argues that the way people think and act is steered by a set of socially constituted schemes that depend on an individual's statusi.e., his or her relative standing within society. Evidence from household and survey data indicates that individual status or factors related to it (such as educational attainment and income) might help explain differences in how leaders conduct fiscal policy.
In our novel empirical analysis, we test whether a head of government's parental status and personal status have an impact on the incumbent government's fiscal performance. We focus on the German Laender, as they are characterised by a high degree of political and 23 Please note that estimating the relationship using Arellano and Bond's (1991) GMM approach does not affect our main conclusions. Results are available on request. 24 Results are available on request.
institutional homogeneity and their prime ministers are empowered with extensive fiscal competences.
Our extremely robust findings reveal that a prime minister's socioeconomic background influences fiscal performance in a statistically significant and economically relevant way. The higher a prime minister's status, the lower the incumbent government's public spending and debt financing in relation to GDP. For example, tenures of upper-class prime ministers are associated with a public expenditure quota that is, on average, about 0.7 percentage points less than that of the tenures of prime ministers who come from the lower class. In the long run, the difference can be as much as 3 percentage points. In the case of net public borrowing over GDP, upper-class prime ministers have a 0.5 percentage point lower deficit in the short run and a 1.2 percentage point lower deficit in the long run.
More generally, our results suggest that economics as a field may not only benefit from incorporating psychology, as shown by the recent surge in experimental and behavioural economics, but also from taking sociology into consideration. The upshot of our and other analyses is that by deviating from homo economicus, economists can increase the explanatory power of their models. Moreover, by including psychological or sociological (and, potentially, other social science) approaches into empirical economic models, we allow for direct competition between different theories. As is well-known in econometric methodology, testing against concrete alternative theoretical hypotheses is a much more powerful method of research than just testing against the data (see, e.g., Hendry 2000) . Thus, in the best case, we would see a convergence of social science research beyond traditional lines of demarcation toward a more serious interdisciplinary analysis. Information on prime ministers' dates of birth, places of residence, occupational histories, and whether they have been union members is from the Munzinger Online biography and the public record offices of the German Laender. Both provide brief biographies of public figures, especially politicians. In a few cases we also rely on information provided on personal homepages of (former) prime ministers. The variable age refers to a prime minister's age at the end of the year.
The variable parental status measures the occupational status score of prime ministers' parents. To construct this variable, we coded the occupations of prime ministers' parents according to the ISCO-68 and then applied the ISEI and SIOPS scores. When both parents were working or when a parent held more than one occupation during his or her career, we decided to employ the highest ISEI and SIOPS score. In cases where a prime minister was raised entirely by one parent only (due to divorce or death of the other parent), we decided to take only the status score of that parent into account. Further, we do not differentiate between biological and stepparents.
For the variable personal status we focus on the positions prime ministers held before their political career, which we defined as first membership in a party executive committee or ministry. In cases where prime ministers engaged in more than one occupation previous to their political career, we chose the occupation with the highest ISEI and SIOPS score.
Additional Figures and Checks for Robustness
Figures A1a and A1b: Public Expenditures over GDP in the West German Laender (in %) Notes: Public expenditures over GDP are calculated as deviations from the contemporary cross-sectional mean. Marks along the series indicate prime minister transitions. ) and initialised by the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator. Standard errors are derived from a parametric bootstrap estimation of the variance-covariance matrix based on 100 repetitions (cf. Kiviet and Bun, 2001 ). Both models include cross-section and time fixed effects. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Table A3 . The different types of prime ministers are defined as follows: High: prime minister has high parental and personal status (ISEI score 0.8); Low: prime minister has low parental and personal status (ISEI score 0.3); Up: prime minister has low parental status (ISEI score 0.3), but high personal status (ISEI score 0.8); Down: prime minister has high parental status (ISEI score 0.8), but low personal status (ISEI score 0.3). Figures are derived as follows: first, the expected amount of public spending/net borrowing is calculated for each prime minister type, holding other factors fixed. Second, the difference between a type i prime minister (row name) and a type j prime minister (column name) is computed. * and ** indicate that the difference is significantly different from zero at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
